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AVOIDING THE PERILS OF JUDICIAL
TR]EATYW1 ITING: IN RE KOREAN AIR
LINES DISASTER
Two years after Charles Lindbergh's historic flight across the
Atlantic, the second of two international conferences completed
work on an equally historic aviation treaty known as the Warsaw
Convention (the "Convention").' The goal of the conferences had
been twofold: first, to establish uniformity in documentation and
legal procedure; 2 and second, to limit the potential liablity of air
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
(United States declaration of adherence deposited at Warsaw, Pol., July 31, 1934; proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention, the Convention, or the treaty].
The Convention was the product of two international conferences, the first held in Paris
in 1925, the second in Warsaw in 1929, and of the work done by the interim Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridique Afriens ("CITEJA"), which had been created by the
Paris Conference. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv.L. REV. 497, 498 (1967). While the United States did not participate in the
interconference work performed by CITEJA and was only represented at the Warsaw Convention by an observer, it viewed the diplomatic activity favorably and deposited its instrument of adherence on July 31, 1934. Id. at 502.
2 See Haskell, The Warsaw System and the U.S. ConstitutionRevisited, 39 J. AIR L. &
COM. 483, 484 (1973); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498-99. The Convention
achieved nearly complete uniformity as to documentation and "to a large degree" regarding
the procedure for resolving claims arising out of international transportation and the applicable substantive law. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498-99; see also Reed
v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977) (treaty praised
for its unifying aspects).
In 1965, the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") Administrator, testifying before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, praised the Warsaw Convention for providing uniformity in the governance of the relationship between air carrier and passenger. See Hague
Protocol to Warsaw Convention: Hearings on Exec. H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1965) (statement of Najeeb
Halaby, Administrator, FAA). Articles 3 through 16 of the Convention standardize the documentation required for passengers and cargo on international flights, while articles 26
through 31 standardize a variety of procedural rules regarding claims for loss and damage.
See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1304-05 (9th Cir.
1982).
Early proponents of the treaty recognized the value of these unifying factors; and, in
transmitting the Convention to the United States Senate in 1934, Secretary of State Cordell
Hull wrote: "It is obviously an advantage to passengers ... to have international uniformity
with respect to . . . documents required in international air transportation." See SENATE
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d
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carriers in the event of an accident.3 The limitation on liability favored the air carriers over the passengers, but the treaty sought to
restrike the balance by creating a presumption of liability against
the carriers.4 Despite its initial wholehearted acceptance of the
Convention,5 the United States soon began to express dissatisfaction with the limitation on liability.6 The United States repeatedly
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934), reprinted in 1934 U.S. Av. Rep. 239, 241 [hereinafter MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT]. The Convention's latter day proponents have been quick to point out
the same benefits. See A. Lowenfeld, Opening statement at the Special International Civil
Aviation Organization Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, held at Montreal, Can. (Feb. 1-15, 1966), reprinted in 54 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 580, 581 (1966) [hereinafter Lowenfeld, Opening Statement].
' See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 499. This second goal was the more
important of the two, see id., and has sparked the most controversy. See Comment, The
Growth of American Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw
Convention, 48 J. Am L. & Com. 805, 806 (1983); infra note 6 and accompanying text.
Recently, courts and commentators have begun to question whether the liability limitation amounts to a taking under the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Aircrash in Bali, 684 F.2d at
1312-13; Comment, After Bali: Can the Warsaw Convention be Proven a Taking Under the
Fifth Amendment?, 49 J. AIR L. & Com. 947, 967-88 (1984). The Convention has also been
attacked on due process and equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Comment, Due Process,
Equal Protectionand the Right to Travel: Can Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention Stand
Up to These ConstitutionalFoes?, 49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 907, 921-33 (1984).
4 Article 17 of the Convention creates an express presumption that a flight-related accident is the result of carrier negligence. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. The
carrier may rebut the presumption, however, by proving all necessary measures were taken
to avoid damages or that taking such measures would have been impossible. See id. art.
21(1); Aircrash in Bali, 684 F.2d at 1305. In exchange, article 22 limits the air carriers'
liability to 125,000 Poincare francs-approximately $8,300. See Note, A ProposedRevision
of the Warsaw Convention, 57 IND. L.J. 297, 297 n.2 (1982). Secretary of State Hull noted
that requiring the carrier to show lack of negligence was reasonable in light of the difficulty
passengers at the time had in establishing the cause of an aviation accident. See MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 243. While acknowledging that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur had aided some plaintiffs, the Secretary of State emphasized that it had yet to
become the rule in all jurisdictions. Id. It is doubtful whether the Secretary's argument is
still valid. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 246-47 (5th
ed. 1984) (current safety records and technological advances have justified the use of res
ipsa loquitur).
5 See 78 CONG. REc. 11,582 (1934). The Senate gave its advice and consent without
debate, committee hearing or report. See id.
6 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 502. While the diplomatic corps argued that the liability limit was too low, the genesis of American dissatisfaction lay much
deeper, and indeed many would have preferred to discard the limitation altogether. See
Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal,33 J. AIR L. & Com. 528, 530-32 (1967). In Ross v.
Pan American Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E. 2d 880 (1949), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947
(1955), the plaintiff, who was known professionally as Jane Froman, was seriously injured
when the plane bringing her from New York to Europe, where she was scheduled to entertain troops for the U.S.O., crashed just outside of Lisbon, Portugal. See id. at 91, 85 N.E.2d
at 881. Despite extensive injuries and high medical bills, she recovered only $8,300-a result
which helped spur the momentum in the United States toward withdrawal from the Con-
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sought reconsideration of the treaty,7 leading finally to the adoption in 1966 of the Montreal Agreement (the "Agreement"), in
which air carriers agreed, among other things, to raise the liability
limitation to $75,000.8 To avoid the literal language of Convention
article 3(2)," which eliminates the limitation on liability only if the
carrier fails to deliver a ticket, courts began to hold that failure to
include adequate notice of the Convention's liability rules on the
ticket would also result in the loss of the limitation. 10 Recently,
vention. See Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM.
291, 294 (1965).
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 590.
' See Order of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement 18900,
reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) (approved by CAB Order No. E-23680, May 13, 1966)
[hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides that "by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." See Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1, art. 22(1). Not all courts have recognized the Montreal Agreement as merely a "special contract" as provided for by article 22(1). See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol.
on Mar. 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983). In Air Crash
Disasterat Warsaw, the Second Circuit interpreted the Montreal Agreement as, essentially,
an amendment to the Convention. See id. at 89. Although the Montreal Agreement is relevant to any discussion of the Warsaw Convention, it is submitted that the Second Circuit
overextended the argument when it suggested the Agreement actually modified article
3(1)(e). See id. The treaty cannot be modified by parties other than the countries adhering
to it. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 644 F. Supp. 1463, 1476 (D.D.C. 1985), af'd, 829
F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
9 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2). Article 3(2) provides that:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall none the less be
subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to
avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability.
Id.
1. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 789 F.2d 1092,
1098, vacated, 795 F.2d 381 (1986), af'd on reh'g in relevant part, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.
1987); In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol. on Mar. 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508,
514 (2d Cir. 1966), afl'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); Egan v. Kolisman
Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 169, 234 N.E.2d. 199, 202-03, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14, 19-20
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968). See also Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, 352 F.2d
494, 498 (9th Cir. 1965) (tickets handed to passengers at foot of boarding ramp did not
constitute delivery and therefore limitation unavailable); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
341 F.2d 851, 857 (2d Cir.) (ticket delivered to passenger after aboard aircraft did not constitute adequate delivery so liability could not be limited), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
But cf. Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955) (court upheld liability
limitation when ticket did not contain names of agreed stopping places), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 989 (1956); R. MANKIEwIcz, THE LIABILTy REGIME OF THE
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11 the United States
however, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster,
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected this
approach and held that a deficiency in notice will not prevent the
air carrier from availing itself of the liability limitation. 2
The plaintiffs' decedents in In re KAL, who were passengers
on board defendant's commercial airliner, were killed when Soviet
military aircraft destroyed the plane over the Sea of Japan. 3 Defendant had delivered tickets to the plaintiffs' decedents prior to
commencement of the trip.14 These tickets contained noticeprinted in eight-point type size-of the applicability of the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations. 15 The plaintiffs moved in
district court for summary judgment, asserting that KAL should
be liable for the full extent of the damages because the notice
printed on the tickets was defective. 16 In a memorandum opinion,
75 (1981) (notice requirement manifests "schizofrenic [sic] jurisprudence of American
courts").
11 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'g 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985) [hereinafter In
re KAL]. The court adopted as its opinion on the limitation of liability issue the comprehensive memorandum of the district court.
12 In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1467-77. Before reaching the merits of the Warsaw Convention claim, the court of appeals addressed the question of whether, upon transfer of a
multi-district claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the precedent of the transferor forum
would bind the transferee court. See In re KAL, 829 F.2d at 1174. The D.C. Circuit concluded that while clearly the rule in diversity cases, see Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612
(1984), the case law of the transferor court merits only "close consideration" on federal
questions. In re KAL, 829 F.2d at 1176.
Had the court found itself bound under the Van Dusen rule to apply the law of the
transferor forum, stare decisis would have compelled it to find, at least for those plaintiffs
whose claims originated in the Second Circuit, that a deficiency in notice on the airline
ticket would prevent the air carrier from availing itself of the Convention's liability limitation. See id. at 1174. The court further noted that, because a 28 U.S.C. § 1407 transfer is
"for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings," the case could eventually be returned for trial to the Second Circuit, where a different interpretation of the Warsaw Convention prevails. Id. at 1176. Acknowledging that this possibility provides "the most anomalous feature" of its decision, the court nonetheless declared that the Second Circuit should
be bound by the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the Warsaw Convention under the "law of
the case" doctrine. See id.
,SIn re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1464. The district court noted that the material facts in
the case were not in dispute. Id.
14Id. Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention states that the carrier "must deliver a
passenger ticket." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
15Article 3(1)(e) of the Warsaw Convention requires that the ticket delivered to a passenger contain "[a] statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established by this Convention." See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(e).
The Montreal Agreement expanded on this requirement, specifying in section 2 that a standard notice be printed in ink contrasting with the stock in at least ten-point type. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 8.
" In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1464. In essence, the plaintiffs based their motion for
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the district court rejected plaintiffs' argument and denied the motion.17 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, adopting the district court's memorandum as
its opinion.18
In denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, District
Judge Robinson turned first to the language of the Convention, 19
where he found no evidence that failure to provide a statement
regarding the Convention's applicability would trigger forfeiture of
the defendant's liability limitation.20 He then considered and rejected a contrary line of cases, 21 and criticized existing case law as
based on the judiciary's discontent with the liability limitation
rather than concern with proper application of the Warsaw-Montreal system's provisions.22 Judge Robinson next examined the
summary judgment on a claim that the Montreal Agreement modified the notice requirement in the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 1467. They argued that the carrier's failure to print
the Montreal Advice in at least 10-point type was tantamount to "non-delivery" of the
ticket under article 3(2), triggering the forfeiture of the air carrier's liability limitation. See
id.
17

Id. at 1464.

18 In re KAL, 829 F.2d at 1173. The court affirmed without dissent. Id.
19 In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472-73. Judge Robinson focused on article 3, sections

1(e) and (2). Id. See also supra notes 9 & 15 (quoting relevant provisions).
"oIn re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472-73. The court asserted that, under article 3(2), inadequate notice may simply be an "irregularity" which will not affect applicability of the rules
of the Convention. Id. Judge Robinson observed that "[a]rticle 3(2) appears directed to the
entire ticket, which is evidence that a contract has been formed, and appears much less
concerned with notice ....
" Id. at 1474.
1 Id. at 1472-75. The notice cases began with Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341
F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965), and Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965). See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472-75. Mertens involved
physical delivery of a ticket, but the court noted that the article 3(2) requirement was intended to provide the passenger with an opportunity to protect himself against the liability
limitation by "deciding not to take the flight, entering a special contract with the carrier, or
taking out additional insurance for the flight." Mertens, 341 F.2d at 856-57. In Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), afl'd by an equally divided
court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968), the court held that the Convention requires not only physical
delivery of the ticket but also adequate notice of the treaty's liability rules. See Lisi, 370
F.2d at 513. Judge Robinson found the Lisi court's determination that the diminutive statement could be equated to non-delivery of the entire contract of carriage to be "somewhat
extreme." See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1474. Moreover, Judge Robinson criticized the
Second Circuit for, in essence, re-writing article 3(2), "which states that failure to include
the statement of limitation on liability does not affect the applicability of the Convention's
rules." Id. While the Second Circuit declared that the limitation on liability was balanced
by the requirement of adequate notice, see Lisi, 370 F.2d at 512-13, Judge Robinson asserted that the actual quid pro quo for the limitation was not notice, but liability without
fault. See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1474.
2 In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1474. Judge Robinson noted there was "no evidence that
the treaty drafters and signatories intended 'adequate notice' to affect the operation of the
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Montreal Agreement's requirement that notice of the liability limitation be printed in ten-point type.2 3 Declaring that the Agreement
"may not be read wholesale into the Warsaw Convention, '24 he
criticized earlier decisions for incorporating the type-size requirement into the treaty.2 5 Moreover, the Montreal Agreement was
prompted by dissatisfaction with the liability limit, not with the
adequacy of notice. 26
The court's approach in In re KAL rejected judicial precedent
of more than twenty years.2 7 While the opinion provided an excellent exposition of the Montreal Agreement's effect on the Warsaw
Convention, it is submitted that the court's interpretation of the
Convention itself was flawed in two related areas: first, in its insistence that article 3(2)'s delivery requirement be viewed as separate
from rather than complementary to article 3(1)(e)'s notice requirements; and second, in its superficial examination of the treaty
taken as a whole. This Comment will review the court's decision
with reference to generally accepted techniques of treaty interpretation. By both reviewing the treaty's language and using extrinsic
interpretive aids, this Comment will attempt to provide a cohesive
method to resolve "notice" issues under the Warsaw-Montreal
system.
ARTICLE

3

OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION

A strict and literal reading of article 3 of the Warsaw Convention would dictate that only non-delivery of the ticket triggers forfeiture of the liability limitation. 2 The In re KAL court, employtreaty limitation." Id. at 1474.
23

See id. at 1474-77. Judge Robinson, addressing Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesell-

schaft v. C.A.B., 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973), noted that, even assuming the existence of a
notice requirement, the court had not yet addressed the question of what constitutes "adequate notice." In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1475.
21 Id. at 1476.
25 Id. at 1475.
26 Id. Judge Robinson found the Montreal Agreement was not an amendment to the
Warsaw Convention, but merely a special agreement between contracting parties and signatories as provided for by the Convention. Id. at 1476. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1,
art. 22(1), (2).
27 See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d
494 (9th Cir. 1965); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 816 (1965).
28 See DeVivo, The Warsaw Convention: Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell?, 49 J.
Ai L. & Com. 71, 86 (1983). See also In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472 (Convention applies
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ing such an analysis, concluded that a mere defect in the notice on
the ticket would not strip the defendant of the Convention's
$75,000 liability limit.29 Exhibiting impatience with what it viewed

as judicial treatywriting, the court posited that "treaty revision is
not the right or responsibility of the judicial branch."'30 However,
the laudable reluctance to engage in judicial revision of interna31
tional compacts led to a somewhat myopic reading of article 3.
The court viewed section 3(1)(e) as separate and distinct from section 3(2).2 It limited "delivery" to its literal meaning s and refused
to consider 3(1)(e) and 3(2) as complementary aspects of an overall
34
notice requirement.

Judge Robinson declared that the Agreement's ten-point type
requirement "has been grafted onto the treaty as the next phase in
the attempt to circumvent the treaty provision." 5 Refusal to make
the Convention's liability limitation contingent upon compliance
with the Montreal Agreement's non-treaty requirements is completely consistent with accepted techniques of treaty interpretaregardless of whether ticket is retained by passenger); supra note 9 (text of relevant
provision).
29 See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1474. While the court did not suggest that it was
relying on a strict and literal reading of article 3, its approach was demonstrated by its
reliance on Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 98 D.L.R.3d 52 (Can. 1979). See In
re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1474. In Ludecke, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that "the
words of art. 3(2) are plain and can admit of no misunderstanding.... The benefit of the
limitation will be lost only where no ticket is delivered." Ludecke, 98 D.L.R.3d at 57.
30 See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1476. The court suggested that "[w]here the political
branches have been stymied, 'judicial treatymaking' to include notice has proved irresistaible to some courts." Id.
11 See, e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 511-12 (1966) (a
literal interpretation may well lead to misinterpretation), aff'd by an equally divided court,
390 U.S. 455 (1968). The Lisi court noted that the language of the Convention, while relevant, must not become a "verbal prison." Id. at 511 (quoting Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S.
335, 358 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
s'See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472-73. Article 3(1)(e) requires a statement that the
transportation is subject to the rules of the Convention, and article 3(2) provides that failure to deliver the ticket will result in the carrier's loss of its liability limitation. See Warsaw
Convention, supra note 1, arts. 3(1)(e), 3(2).
'" See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472-73. See also supra note 28 and accompanying
text (court's determination that essential question is whether ticket has been delivered into
possession of passenger).
" See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472-73. The Lisi court came to a contrary conclusion, arguing that "the language of Article 3 cannot be considered in isolation; rather, it
must be viewed in light of the other Articles and the overall purposes of the Convention."
Lisi, 370 F.2d at 512. See also Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 497 (9th Cir.
1965) (article 3(2) should not be read in isolation).
" See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1475.
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tion.36 However, the In re KAL court's assertion that article 3(2) is
concerned with the physical delivery of the ticket only as evidence
of a contract between the carrier and the passenger3 7 is inconsistent with the fundamental Conference goal that airline passengers
know of the applicability of the Convention's rules before traveling."' Furthermore, if the court's strict reading of article 3 were
correct, the existence of 3(1)(e), requiring a "statement" that the
transportation is subject to the Convention's liability rules, would
be virtually unnecessary.3 9
3' See

id. at 1475-76.

The application of the Montreal Agreement is somewhat confused by the court's discussion of Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. C.A.B., 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
where the D.C. Circuit upheld the CAB's authority to supplement article 3 by requiring
notice of the Convention's applicability in 10-point type. See id. at 1475. In Deutsche, the
court cited Lisi with approval, declaring that "[p]assengers ... [should] not. . . be required
to traverse an obstacle course... to successfully discover the nature of their rights and the
substance of the carriers' limitations on liability." See Deutsche, 479 F.2d at 917. Judge
Robinson attempted to avoid the problem presented in Deutsche by suggesting that,
whatever the resolution of the issues presented by the Warsaw Convention's notice requirement, the court of appeals had yet to define "adequate notice." In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at
1475. It is suggested that, in adopting the district court's decision, the court of appeals
should expressly have overruled statements in Deutsche contrary to the current opinion.
Had it done so, the current decision would have been based squarely on the court's holding
that the statement required by article 3(1)(e) cannot be linked to the forfeiture provision in
article 3(2). Id. at 1472-73.
37 See id. at 1473.
3 See Block v. Compaignie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). The court agreed that the contract plays an essential role
in the Warsaw-Montreal system but it did not end its analysis there, electing instead to
examine the obligations arising out of the contract. Id. From these obligations, the court
extrapolated an intent on the part of the signatories to the agreement to "carry out the
Conference goal that the rules of limited liability be known to both parties," a knowledge
that would enable passengers to determine the amount of insurance they would need. Id.
"' See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341
F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965). In Mertens, the ticket was delivered to
plaintiffs' decedent after he boarded the plane; the court held as a matter of law that this
did not constitute adequate delivery. Mertens, 341 F.2d at 857. The decision's true significance, however, is in the court's determination that article 3(2) requires the ticket to be
delivered to the passenger in a manner which affords him "a reasonable opportunity to take
measures to protect himself against the limitation of liability." Id. at 856. The court then
intimated that the article 3(2) delivery requirement would make little sense unless the
ticket were delivered "in such circumstances as to afford the passenger a reasonable opportunity to take these self-protective measures," id. at 857, and that the article 3(1)(e) requirement regarding a statement of the carrier's liability limitation would be all but meaningless if it were not related to the delivery requirement. Id.
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THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

Strict construction of the language of a treaty or international
agreement, without more, bypasses numerous canons of interpretation, many of which have been recognized by the Supreme Court.40
In Air France v. Saks,4 1 the Supreme Court applied four interpretive aids to resolve Warsaw Convention issues: (1) the language
of the treaty itself and the context in which it is used;42 (2) the
legal meaning attached to the French text;4 3 (3) the travaux pre44 and (4)
paratoires;
the case law of sister signatories. 45 The Court
further noted that a review of the post-ratification actions of the
signatories may help resolve issues arising under the treaty.4 A
compelling example of subsequent action by a signatory nation is
the Civil Aeronautics Board's ("CAB") regulation requiring tenpoint type for notice of the Convention's applicability. 47 While a
40

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

147

(1965). This Comment does not propose that the various canons of treaty interpretation are

in and of themselves dispositive; like maxims, they may often be found contradictory of one
another. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); see also J.
STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS 189 (1974) (canons of treaty interpretation leave a wide field
for "uninhibited creative choice by the [c]ourt"). Nevertheless, the canons are helpful guides
which merit review.
41 470 U.S. 392 (1985). Resolution of the issue before the Court in Air France
required
a definition of "accident" as used in article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 394-96.
42 See id. at 397; Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963). It is submitted that
had the In re KAL court examined article 3(2) in the context of the entire Warsaw Conven-

tion, indeed within the context of article 3 itself, it would have recognized that its rigid
interpretation of the delivery requirement was not consistent with the purpose behind article 3(1)(e). See also In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on Apr. 22, 1974, 462 F. Supp. 1114,
1120 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (whenever
possible, treaty provisions should be construed to be consistent with each other).
"' Saks, 470 U.S. at 399. It appears, however, that there is no French case law to aid in
the interpretation of the French text. See R. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 10, at 74.
" Saks, 470 U.S. at 400. In this instance, the travaux preparatoires(the preparatory
work done on the treaty, including minutes from the meetings and debates) provided no real
guidance for an understanding of article 3, and courts and commentators were left to speculate as to the intention of the drafters. See, e.g., DeVivo, supra note 28, at 110 (treaty
drafters did not anticipate the judicial scrutiny to which article 3 has been subjected).
" Saks, 470 U.S. at 404. See also S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, 1 AVIATION TORT LAW § 11:6,
at 641 (Convention should be interpreted as uniformly as possible). The district court did
apply this canon by relying on Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 98 D.L.R.3d 52
(Can. 1979). See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1474. Nevertheless, the quest for international
judicial symmetry cannot be dispositive of the issue. See supra note 40.
46 Saks, 470 U.S. at 403. See also Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 351 F. Supp.
702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (tariff filed by airline reviewed to determine whether "accident"
encompasses hijackings), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
"ISee 14 C.F.R. § 221.175(a) (1987).
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regulation cannot itself create a duty requiring carriers to give notice to passengers,4 8 its very existence indicates that the United
States assumes such a duty exists and the CAB regulation merely
clarifies the article 3(1)(e) provision
requiring a "statement" as to
49
the Convention's applicability.
While paying deference to the general rule that treaties should
be interpreted liberally and with a keen appreciation of their purpose,5 ° the In re KAL court never applied such an analysis to the
Convention. 51 The court, failing to find express language linking a
failure to provide notice to loss of limited liability, ended its investigation. 2 Yet, had it explored further, the court would have found
a notice requirement compatible with one of the Convention's major goals, namely, the establishment of uniform documentation and
53
legal procedure.
48 Cf. In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1476 (a government may not unilaterally dispose of

treaty limitation).
49 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2. The Agreement requires each carrier,
when the ticket is delivered, to furnish passengers covered by the Warsaw Convention with
a notice, printed in at least ten-point type, which provides that:
Passengers... are advised that the provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw
Convention may be applicable .... For such passengers ... the Convention...
provide[s] that the liability of... [the] carriers. . . for death of or personal injury
to passengers is limited in most cases to proven damages not to exceed US $75,000
per passenger ....
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchasing insurance....
Id.

zo See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1471. The Supreme Court has long held that treaties

are accorded a more liberal interpretation than private agreements, declaring that "we may
look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties." Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318
U.S. 423, 432 (1943). For a general discussion of the interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, see R. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 10, at 23-26.
51 See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472-77. It is true that, in discussing adequate notice,
the court criticized Lisi and related cases for failing to give weight to the history of the
Warsaw-Montreal system, id. at 1473-74, and later wrote that "[n]othing in the debate or
dissatisfaction with the [liability] limitation which led to the Montreal Agreement confirms
the contention that 'adequate notice' was an issue." Id. at 1475. But these passing phrases,
however apropos, are not indicative of a truly serious application of the standard techniques
of treaty interpretation. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
82 See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1475; supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
s See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1464-66. While the court examined the Warsaw Convention, the decision followed the historical progression only of the limitation on liability.
See id. Although the limitation on liability was the initial driving force behind the treaty,
see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 499, that is no longer the case, particularly in
the United States. See Comment, The Growth of American JudicialHostility Towards the
Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J. AIR L. & Com. 805, 830 (1983). The
court recognized this fact, but failed to give it any weight in analyzing article 3(1)(e). See In

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:156

It is submitted that the more accurate analysis of article 3 is
that offered by the Second Circuit in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane, S.p.A." In Lisi, the district court found the notice of liability limitation on the ticket to be "camouflaged in Lilliputian
print in a thicket of 'Conditions of Contract'..

.,5

and the court of

appeals agreed, declaring that "[t]he simple truth is... [that it is]
so artfully camouflaged that [its] presence is concealed.

'56

It is

submitted that in reading 3(1)(e) and 3(2) as complementary, the
Lisi court discerned the proper balance between the two sections.2
The court reasoned that the Convention's arbitrary limitations on
liability, which work to the benefit of the carriers, must be balanced by delivery to the passenger of a ticket complete with adere KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1472-74.
In 1965, when the United States formally denounced the Warsaw Convention, it did so
"solely because of the convention's low limits of liability." See Text of Notice of Denunciation, reprintedin 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923, 924 (1965). The United States remained a signatory under the Convention, not because it felt the limitation on liability remained a key
ingredient of the treaty, but rather because it recognized the continuing viability of the
uniformity provided by the Convention as well as the value of international cooperation. See
Lowenfeld, Opening Statement, supra note 2, at 580-81. It would seem, therefore, that the
purpose of air carrier protection is no longer a preeminent justification for the treaty and
has been supplanted by the desirability of a uniform international system. Cf. Martin, The
Defendant's View of Montreal, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 538, 538-41 (1967) (uniformity of documentation has been very beneficial). Since a primary canon of treaty interpretation is to
look to the subsequent action of the parties, see supra note 46 and accompanying text, there
no longer seems to be any need to pursue the strict interpretation of article 3(1)(e) rendered
by the In re KAL court. Cf. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 513
(2d Cir. 1966) (notice especially important in United States where no similar limits on domestic travel exist), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
'" Lisi, 370 F.2d at 513. The Lisi court argued that the quid pro quo for the "one-sided
advantage" to the air carrier was the delivery of a ticket with adequate notice of the substantial liability limitation. Id. at 512-13. Viewed strictly, this is incorrect, because the quid
pro quo envisioned by the drafters of the Convention was the liability limit in exchange for
the shift in the burden of proof. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 499-500.
Yet it would seem that underlying the Lisi court's statement is an awareness of the changing values surrounding the Convention. Cf. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53,
61, 203 N.E. 640, 643, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 253 (1964) (limiting interpretation to situation at
time treaty drafted would be inequitable).
5 Lisi, 253 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
58 See Lisi, 370 F.2d at 514.
17 See Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 528,
532 (1967). It
is true that neither the Montreal Agreement, the requisite tariffs, nor the CAB order approving the tariffs expressly provided a sanction for failure to give notice. Id. Nevertheless,
subsequent actions such as the Montreal Agreement have delineated a relationship between
notice and the passenger's ability to protect himself against liability limitation, and it would
seem that the breach of such a crucial duty should result in the loss of the liability limita-

tion. Cf. H. DRION,

LIMITATIONS ON LIABILrriEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

267-68 (1954) (loss of

limitation limited to non-delivery to ensure sanction related to seriousness of breach).

1987]

JUDICIAL TREATYWRITING

quate notice of the Convention's applicability."
A PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Resolution of Warsaw Convention claims involving lack of notice requires sensitivity not only to the goals of the Convention but
to the historical treatment accorded the treaty itself.59 It is essential to remember also that the Warsaw Convention, at least for
most American passengers, has been supplemented by the Montreal Agreement.6 0 Nevertheless, while it may shift the quid pro
quo of the Convention,61 the Agreement does not amount to an
amendment of the treaty.62 As a result, courts can resolve whether
or not there is a notice requirement only through an examination
63
of the Convention itself.
While this Comment has argued that the Convention does require notice, it has not identified the requirements of adequate notice. 64 It is here that the notice provision of the Montreal Agreement, which is modelled after an earlier CAB regulation, may
provide guidelines to determine the adequacy of notice. 5 Because
See Lisi, 370 F.2d at 512-13.
See DeVivo, supra note 28, at 111-12. Although courts cannot simply disregard the
Convention's liability limitations, they do have authority to "utilize the historical looking
glass which has been welded by the recurrent reservations expressed by the United States
over Article 22"--a method which should lead to a flexible interpretation of the treaty embracing a pragmatic resolution of the issues. Id. at 112.
£0 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 8. The Agreement applies to international
transportation under the Convention, "which, according to the Contract of Carriage, includes a point in the United States of America as a point of origin, point of destination, or
agreed stopping place." Id., art. 1.
6' See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1475-76.
62 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 8. The Agreement was signed by the carriers,
not the parties to the Convention, and in it they agreed to raise the limit of liability to
$75,000, to waive any defense in article 20(1), and to furnish tickets with what has come to
be known as the Montreal Advice. See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1475-76. The result is not
that the Agreement alters the quid pro quo, which remains a shift in the burden of proof to
the carriers in exchange for a limitation on liability, but merely that it recalibrates the two
elements of the bargain. See id.
68 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22. The Convention sets the carrier's
liability at what amounts to $8,300 but provides that, "by special contract, the carrier and
the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." Id., art. 22(1). The Montreal Agreement, then, is a special contract under which the carriers have agreed to raise the liability
limitation, but it is in no way an amendment to the Convention. See In re KAL, 664 F.
Supp. at 1476.
0' The Convention itself simply requires that a "statement" as to the treaty's liability
limitation be contained on the ticket; it offers no further guidance. See Warsaw Convention,
supra note 1, art. 3(1)(e).
05 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol. on Mar. 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85, 89-90 (2d
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the CAB has adopted the Agreement and has made its acceptance
a condition precedent to receipt of a Foreign Air Carrier Permit to
operate in the United States,66 the Montreal Agreement has become compelling evidence of an executive branch determination
that the Warsaw Convention's notice requirement may be met by
strict compliance with the Agreement.67 Nevertheless, because the
Agreement does not amount to an amendment to the Warsaw Convention, it cannot be said that the Montreal Agreement's ten-point
type requirement is absolutely necessary to constitute adequate
notice. 8 As it stands now, the Montreal Agreement may provide a
benchmark and nothing more.6 9
As long as the United States remains a party to the Warsaw
Convention,7 0 American courts will be forced to wrestle with its
provisions.7 ' Still, resolution of the difficulties presented by the
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit appears to have
overlooked the fact that the Montreal Agreement is not an amendment to the Convention
and has held that the ten-point type guideline established in the Agreement amounts to a
"bright-line" test for determining what constitutes adequate notice. Id. at 90. Although this
result avoids the necessity of a case-by-case determination of whether or not the notice is
adequate, such an arbitrary line should not simply be read into the treaty and courts should
remain diligent in applying the Montreal Agreement as a special contract under the Convention rather than as an amendment to the treaty. See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1475.
The "bright-line" rule would render carriers liable without limitation even though they may
have complied with the Warsaw Convention's requirement, however undefined, of adequate
notice.
14 C.F.R. § 211.20(t) (1987); DeVivo, supra note 28, at 88-95 (1983).
e See In re Aircrash Disaster at Warsaw, 705 F.2d at 90 ("the CAB's acceptance of
the Montreal Agreement indicates a judgment by at least the executive branch that 10-point
type was necessary to provide sufficient notice"). While this Comment has suggested that
the Second Circuit erred in holding that the Montreal Agreement constituted a "brightline" rule for determining the adequacy of notice, see supra note 65, it has not meant to
suggest that the Agreement is irrelevant regarding notice, but only that it should not be the
sole criterion for a determination of adequacy. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 152 (1965) (in determining international agreement's
effect as domestic law, court should give great weight to interpretation by executive branch).
68 See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1476. See also DeVivo, supra note 28, at 102 (executive branch concerned about adequacy of notice, not specified type size, when Montreal
Agreement negotiated).
" See, e.g., Millikin Trust Co. v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana, S.A., 11 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17,331, 17,332 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969) (eight-point type acceptable because
"easily readable"), afl'd mem., 36 App. Div. 2d 582, 317 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1971).
Indeed, it is submitted that the eight-point type notice provided by KAL may well have
constituted adequate notice. It has simply been the contention of this Comment that the
issue of notice must be addressed.
70 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984) (executive branch continues to maintain Convention's liability limit enforceable in United
States).
71 See supra note 10.
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Convention will not quell American dissatisfaction with the treaty,
for the prevailing mood in this country has been emphatic-as long
as the Convention contains a limitation on liability it will be
deemed unacceptable. 72 It is clear, however, that this fundamental
dissatisfaction with the Convention is beyond the pale of judicial
authority and can be settled only by the political departments. 3
CONCLUSION

Concerned with what it viewed as judicial proclivity to rewrite
those sections of the Warsaw Convention found most troublesome,
the In re KAL court engaged in a strict reading of the treaty's provisions. The court's restrained review of the treaty led it to conclude that inadequate notice of the liability limitation does not require the loss of that limitation. It is submitted, however, that the
court erred by pursuing a truncated review of article 3 and by
overlooking the guiding principles behind-and the historical development of-the Warsaw Convention. The court's oversensitivity
to the perils of judicial treatywriting resulted in a narrow interpretation of the Convention. A preferable solution to the issue would
have been to follow the Lisi court's analytical guidelines for article
3 as well as the Supreme Court's guidelines for the resolution of
Warsaw Convention issues.
Brian Whiteley

72 See L. KREINDLER, 1 AVIATION AcCIDENT LAW § 12B.03[1], at 58 (rev. ed. 1980 &
Supp. 1987); DeVivo, supra note 28, at 75. "What is needed . . . is a new system which
abandons all liability limitations and realizes that new monetary ceilings belabor the antiquity of an outdated system." DeVivo, supra note 28, at 75.
71 See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1475. "While American courts may be justifiably
frustrated with the anachronism which the treaty limitation has become, it is not within the
province of the judiciary to alter the quid pro quo agreed to by the political branches." Id.

